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I argue in this paper that the debate over composition is factually empty; in other words, I argue that there’s no fact of the matter whether there are any composite objects like tables and rocks and cats. Moreover, at the end of...
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I argue in this paper that the debate over composition is factually empty; in other words, I argue that there’s no fact of the matter whether there are any composite objects like tables and rocks and cats. Moreover, at the end of the paper, I explain how my argument is suggestive of a much more general (and much more radical) conclusion, namely, that there’s no fact of the matter whether there are any material objects at all. Roughly speaking, the paper proceeds by arguing that (a) if there were a fact of the matter about whether composite objects exist, then it would be either a necessary fact or a contingent fact, and (b) both of these alternatives are implausible.
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I develop here a novel version of the Fregean view of belief ascriptions (i.e., sentences of the form ‘S believes that p’) and I explain how my view accounts for various problem cases that many philosophers have supposed are inc...
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I develop here a novel version of the Fregean view of belief ascriptions (i.e., sentences of the form ‘S believes that p’) and I explain how my view accounts for various problem cases that many philosophers have supposed are incompatible with Fregeanism. The so-called problem cases involve (a) what Perry calls essential indexicals and (b) de re ascriptions in which it is acceptable to substitute coreferential but non-synonymous terms in belief contexts. I also respond to two traditional worries about what the sense of a proper name could be, and I explain how my view provides intuitively pleasing solutions to Kripke’s ‘London’–‘Londres’ puzzle and his Paderewski puzzle. Finally, in addition to defending my view, I also argue very briefly against Russellian alternatives to Fregeanism.
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It is argued here that there is no fact of the matter between direct reference theory and neo-Fregeanism. To get a more precise idea of the central thesis of this paper, consider the following two claims: (i) While direct referenc...
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It is argued here that there is no fact of the matter between direct reference theory and neo-Fregeanism. To get a more precise idea of the central thesis of this paper, consider the following two claims: (i) While direct reference theory and neo-Fregeanism can be developed in numerous ways, they can be developed in essentially parallel ways; that is, for any (plausible) way of developing direct reference theory, there is an essentially parallel way of developing neo-Fregeanism, and vice versa. And (ii) for each such pair of theories, there is no fact of the matter as to which of them is superior; or more precisely, they are tied in terms of factual accuracy. These are sweeping claims that cannot be fully justified in a single paper. But arguments are given here that motivate these theses, i.e., that suggest that they are very likely true.
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This paper considers the empirical evidence that we currently have for various kinds of determinism that might be relevant to the thesis that human beings possess libertarian free will. Libertarianism requires a very strong versio...
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This paper considers the empirical evidence that we currently have for various kinds of determinism that might be relevant to the thesis that human beings possess libertarian free will. Libertarianism requires a very strong version of indeterminism, so it can be refuted not just by universal determinism, but by some much weaker theses as well. However, it is argued that at present, we have no good reason to believe even these weak deterministic views and, hence, no good reason—at least from this quarter—to doubt that we are libertarian free. In particular, the paper responds to various arguments for neural and psychological determinism, arguments based on the work of people like Honderich, Tegmark, Libet, Velmans, Wegner, and Festinger. Keywords Determinism - Libertarianism - Free will - Neural determinism - Psychological determinism
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This note is a guide for mathematicians who don't know much about the philosophy of mathematics-a guide that explains how to read philosophers of mathematics. I hope to make clear for mathematicians what philosophers of mathematic...
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This note is a guide for mathematicians who don't know much about the philosophy of mathematics-a guide that explains how to read philosophers of mathematics. I hope to make clear for mathematicians what philosophers of mathematics are really up to and eliminate some confusions.
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Hermeneutic non-assertivism is a thesis that mathematical fictionalists might want to endorse in responding to a recent objection due to John Burgess. Brad Armour-Garb has argued that hermeneutic non-assertivism is false. A respon...
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Hermeneutic non-assertivism is a thesis that mathematical fictionalists might want to endorse in responding to a recent objection due to John Burgess. Brad Armour-Garb has argued that hermeneutic non-assertivism is false. A response is given here to Armour-Garb's argument.
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